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A review of virulent Newcastle disease
viruses in the United States and the role of wild
birds in viral persistence and spread
Vienna R. Brown1* and Sarah N. Bevins2

Abstract
Newcastle disease is caused by virulent strains of Newcastle disease virus (NDV), which causes substantial morbidity and mortality events worldwide in poultry. The virus strains can be differentiated as lentogenic, mesogenic, or
velogenic based on a mean death time in chicken embryos. Currently, velogenic strains of NDV are not endemic in
United States domestic poultry; however, these strains are present in other countries and are occasionally detected
in wild birds in the U.S. A viral introduction into domestic poultry could have severe economic consequences due to
the loss of production from sick and dying birds, the cost of control measures such as depopulation and disinfection
measures, and the trade restrictions that would likely be imposed as a result of an outbreak. Due to the disease-free
status of the U.S. and the high cost of a potential viral incursion to the poultry industry, a qualitative risk analysis was
performed to evaluate the vulnerabilities of the U.S. against the introduction of virulent strains of NDV. The most likely
routes of virus introduction are explored and data gathered by several federal agencies is provided. Recommendations are ultimately provided for data that would be useful to further understand NDV on the landscape and to utilize
all existing sampling opportunities to begin to comprehend viral movement and further characterize the risk of NDV
introduction into the U.S.
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1 Introduction
Newcastle disease (ND) occurs in poultry and can
have devastating economic effects on global domestic
poultry production. Newcastle disease virus (NDV)
was previously synonymous with avian paramyxo‑
virus type 1 (APMV-1); however, due to changes in
taxonomy is now referred to as avian avulavirus [1].
Avian avulavirus and NDV are used interchangeably
in this manuscript. NDV can be distinguished into
three distinct pathotypes based on mean death time
in chicken embryos, lentogenic (40–60 h), mesogenic
(60–90 h), and velogenic (90–150 h) [2]. The amino
acid sequence at the fusion cleavage site is related to
virulence as specific sequences can be cleaved systemi‑
cally as compared to others which can only be cleaved
in specific host tissues leading to a local infection. In
this way, all velogenic viruses are virulent but not all
virulent strains are velogenic. This disease is listed
by the World Health Organisation for Animals (OIE)
as vitally important for avian species and products
and virus detection in a specific geographical loca‑
tion often leads to trade restrictions and embargos [3].
Virulent Newcastle disease is listed as a Tier 1 USDA
Select Agent as it is a pathogen of national concern
and a significant threat to animal agriculture in the
U.S. Only mesogenic and velogenic viruses found in
poultry species, require mandatory reporting to the
OIE. Virulent strains, typically mesogens and velo‑
gens, of avian avulavirus are endemic in the majority
of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, as well as parts
of Central and South America in domestic poultry
species [4]. In the United States, virulent strains are
present in wild pigeons and cormorants, but domes‑
tic poultry are free of these virus forms. Detection of
velogenic NDV in domestic poultry could have devas‑
tating financial effects on the industry as well as the
nation at large. The last outbreak of velogenic NDV in
the United States occurred in 2002–2003 in Califor‑
nia, Nevada, Arizona, and Texas in domestic poultry
(confined to backyard flocks in the latter three states,
but did spillover into a commercial operation in Cali‑
fornia) resulting in the culling of 3.16 million birds at a
cost of $121 million [5]. Low virulence strains of NDV
occur throughout the world in both domestic and wild
bird species. Understanding the importance wild bird
species may play in the maintenance and transmission
of this virus in addition to their proximity to domestic
poultry production is needed in order to minimize the
risk of infection. This manuscript further describes the
zoonotic potential for this disease, as well as available
vaccines, and commonly used diagnostic tools. Fur‑
thermore, a risk assessment is described and recom‑
mendations are provided.
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1.1 Description of the virus and infection kinetics

A negative sense, single stranded RNA virus is responsi‑
ble for Newcastle disease, also referred to as avian avula‑
virus, which is capable of infecting more than 250 species
of birds [4]. This virus is endemic in many parts of the
world and has been known to cause epizootic outbreaks
in domestic poultry on six of the seven continents [6].
The genome contains 6 genes and their corresponding
structural proteins: (1) a nucleocapsid protein (NP), (2) a
phosphoprotein (P), (3) a matrix protein (M), (4) a fusion
protein (F), (5) a hemagglutinin-neuraminidase protein
(HN), and (6) a RNA polymerase (L) [7, 8].
The molecular basis for the variation in virulence has
been determined and is attributed to amino acids at the
cleavage site on the fusion protein, which mediates cellvirus and cell–cell interaction and fusion [9]. Three or
more arginine (R) or lysine (K) residues starting at posi‑
tion 113 and a phenylalanine (F) at position 117 are
found in all virulent strains of the virus. The precursor
fusion protein, F0, must be cleaved to proteins F1 and
F2 by host cell proteases in order for infection to begin
via cell fusion and the activation of hemolytic properties;
the proteases recognize the specific amino acid motif at
the F protein cleavage site [3, 10]. Viruses with a virulent
cleavage site can be cleaved by proteases found in nearly
every cell in the body allowing for a systemic infection
to occur and extensive viral replication; however, if the F
protein cleavage site does not contain that specific amino
acid motif, cleavage can only be mediated by trypsin and
trypsin-like enzymes found in the respiratory and intes‑
tinal tracts which leads to restricted host site replication
[11, 12]. The hemagglutinin-neuraminidase protein also
plays an instrumental role in tissue tropism and virulence
of NDV by promoting the fusion activity of the F pro‑
tein, facilitating host cell penetration, and removing sialic
acid from progeny virus to prevent self-agglutination [9].
Enveloped viruses, including NDV, have been found to
enter host cells via direct fusion methods in which the
viral envelope fuses with the plasma membrane of the
host cell or a receptor-mediated endocytosis mechanism
in which the virus binds to a specific receptor on the host
cell surface and membrane fusion results in translocation
of the nucleocapsid into the cytoplasm of the host cell
[13, 14].
It is important to note that avian avulaviruses has been
used as a therapeutic agent in the treatment of human
cancer. Replication-competent oncolytic viruses, such
as NDV, have a pronounced anti-tumoral effect by both
local and systemic inoculation routes [15, 16]. NDV
has been found to efficiently and selectively replicate
within and destroy tumor cells, but not normal cells,
and intra-lesion inoculation in an athymic mouse model
has resulted in complete tumor regression [17]. Avian

Brown and Bevins Vet Res (2017) 48:68

avulaviruses can stably express foreign genes and as
such, experimental trails have been conducted where the
gene for IL-2 is incorporated [18]. NDV in combination
with IL-2 was found to be especially T cell stimulatory
which increases the anti-tumor capacity. A strong type
1 interferon response is induced in non-permissive spe‑
cies, such as humans, which results in the anti-neoplastic
and immune stimulatory properties observed with NDV
infection [19].
1.2 Transmission and clinical signs

NDV is primarily transmitted via inhalation or inges‑
tion of virus shed in feces and respiratory secretions by
infected birds for variable lengths of time [3, 4, 20]. Some
virus isolates have been found to be transmitted through
the egg to the hatching chick [21]. Furthermore, virus has
been found to be present in all parts of the carcass and
is able to persist for many months on both chicken skin
and bone marrow if kept at refrigerated temperatures [4].
The virus is relatively stable outside of a host and in the
environment, thus making fomite transmission a possi‑
bility. Infectious virus has been found to survive 7 days
in the summer, 14 days during the spring, and 30 days
in the winter in poultry houses that were contaminated
by infected birds [22]. An older study demonstrated the
duration of infectious virus using various materials and
temperatures which suggests that NDV is a highly stable
virus on multiple types of materials and at various tem‑
peratures [23] and confirms the concern of fomites as a
vehicle for virus introduction or during an outbreak.
The incubation period is typically 2–15 days postexposure. Gallinaceous birds (chickens, turkeys, grouse,
pheasants, and partridges) shed infectious virus for up to
1–2 weeks following infection; however, psittacine birds
(parrots, parakeets, and macaws) have demonstrated the
capacity to shed infectious virus for several months to
1 year following infection, primarily via respiratory secre‑
tions and feces [24, 25]. It is likely that the mortality rate
for chicks born with virulent NDV infections would be
very high, especially as maternal antibody levels waned.
The clinical manifestation of a velogenic strain of NDV,
typically results in a primarily intestinal infection charac‑
terized by hemorrhagic lesions found in the intestines of
dead birds (termed viscerotropic velogenic) or a predom‑
inantly respiratory and neurological infection (referred to
as neurotropic velogenic) [6]. Neurological signs are also
often observed with velogenic infections, especially in
birds with partial immunity who often go on to develop a
chronic infection, and the signs typically include tremors,
ataxia, torticollis, and paresis or paralysis of the wings or
legs which develop several days post-infection [4]. Both
wild and domestic species can develop similar neuro‑
tropic signs. Mesogenic viruses can cause clinical disease
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which typically include respiratory and neurological signs
but the infection is self-limiting, and mortality is rare in
older birds unless there are secondary bacterial infections
[4]. Lesions associated with both velogenic and meso‑
genic strains of NDV infection are most often detected in
the central nervous system (CNS), alimentary tract, renal
system, or respiratory tract and viruses virulent in wild
bird populations tend to affect the CNS or kidneys or to
cause systemic disease that results in rapid mortality in
the absence of recognizable gross or histopathological
lesions [3].
1.3 Geographical distribution

Newcastle disease is believed to have first been reported
in 1926 in both Newcastle-on-Tyne, England and the
island of Java, which is part of current day Indonesia;
however, there is evidence of prior emergence based on
literature in which outbreaks of disease similar to NDV
were reported [26]. The virus is now endemic or causes
epizootic events on a global scale [6]. Avian avulavirus
strains are phylogenetically classified into class I and
class II and class II are further differentiated into separate
genotypes based on genetic and geographic variations
[27]. Pigeon paramyxovirus type 1 (PPMV-1) is a type of
avian avulavirus and is listed under class II, genotype VIb
viruses (Additional file 1).
The viral presence in both Mexico and Canada was spe‑
cifically investigated as their disease status influences risk
of viral introduction into the United States based on close
proximity. Virulent strains of NDV are endemic in Mex‑
ico, isolates detected typically belong to the class II, gen‑
otype V viruses [28]. Sampling of free-ranging wild birds,
captive wild birds, and domestic poultry demonstrate
continued circulation and evolution of these viruses [29].
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency states that viru‑
lent strains of NDV are exotic to poultry in Canada; how‑
ever, similar to the U.S., wild birds in Canada have been
found to harbor these viruses [30].

2 Wild bird reservoir species
Birds of the Columbidae family (pigeons and doves) and
double-crested cormorants (Phalacrocorax auritus) have
been implicated as reservoir species for virulent strains
of NDV in North America [31]. Sampling of mute swans
(Cygnus olor) in the Great Lakes region and along the
Atlantic coast of the United States resulted in the detec‑
tion of live virus and NDV antibodies in 8.7 and 60% of
birds, respectively [32]. This suggests that mute swans
are regularly exposed to avian avulaviruses and may con‑
tribute to viral maintenance in the environment. Kim
et al. sampled waterfowl and shorebirds from eight states
within the U.S. and compared them to samples from live
bird markets collected between 2005 and 2006 and found
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genetically related viruses [33]. Research on NDV in wild
ducks, gulls, and shorebirds found novel viral diversity,
but no fusion gene sequences associated with high patho‑
genicity in poultry [34]. These findings indicate that viral
transmission may occur between wild birds and poul‑
try, but virulent strains are likely not reservoired by the
majority of wild birds, with pigeons, doves, and doublecrested cormorants being the exception.
Interestingly, evaluation of wild birds on four conti‑
nents between 1997 and 2014 resulted in the repeated
isolation of vaccine-derived NDV [35]. These vaccinederived isolates were found in 17 species with the highest
frequency detected in Columbiformes and Anseriformes.
Not surprisingly, the vaccine strain viruses found cor‑
responded to those that are most widely utilized as vac‑
cines—La Sota and B1. These findings are troubling as
passaging through wild bird species may provide selective
pressures that could lead to antigenic drift or an increase
in virulence. While concerning, there is no documented
case of vaccine strains recombining with wild type strains
in wild birds; however, research to date on NDV viral
dynamics in wild birds has been limited and more thor‑
ough exploration could better determine if this is occur‑
ring. There is, however, one case of a low virulence wild
bird strain from class II genotype I NDV mutating to a
virulent strain after circulating for many months in thou‑
sands of chickens that lead to the 1998 ND outbreak in
Australia [36].
2.1 Double‑crested cormorants

The first documented mortality event associated with
NDV in wild avian species, young double-crested cormo‑
rants, was first reported in Canada in 1975. Since then,
several other outbreaks have occurred in the 1990s and
2000s in both the U.S. and Canada and sero-prevalence
in adult birds is high [37–39]. A study conducted on
breeding and wintering grounds in the U.S. and Canada
between 2009 and 2011, found the average antibody
prevalence in adult birds, across all years and locations,
to be 85.2% [31]. Live, infectious NDV isolates were iso‑
lated from 6 chicks, half of which exhibited clinical signs
typical of a NDV infection. Furthermore, virulent NDV
from outbreaks in double-crested cormorants have been
implicated in causing mortality in pelicans, gulls, and
other shorebirds [40, 41]. Findings suggest that doublecrested cormorants are regularly exposed to avian avula‑
virus isolates and that these infections are not necessarily
lethal. They may play an important role in maintaining
and amplifying the virus in nature. Double-crested
cormorants inhabit a large portion of North America
between their breeding and wintering grounds and this
nearly ubiquitous distribution underlines their important
role in the spread of NDV [42].
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2.2 Columbidae birds

Numerous species of wild and domestic pigeons and
doves have been implicated in the maintenance and
transmission of pigeon paramyxovirus serotype 1
(PPMV-1) which is a class II, genotype VIb avian avula‑
virus that is host-adapted to pigeons and other Columbi‑
form birds [27, 43]. These viruses are virulent variants of
avian avulavirus that have circulated in pigeons and are
adapted to this species. These viruses are considered to
be panzootic despite having originated in the Middle East
and being detected as early as the 1980s [43]. Columbi‑
form birds are the primary host species; however, spillo‑
ver events into domestic poultry have been reported and
serial passages through embyronated chicken eggs or
domestic poultry species appears to result in selection
for more virulent traits [44, 45]. Clinical signs associated
with PPMV-1 infection in layer hens is typically limited
to a sharp reduction in egg production, mis-shapen eggs,
or soft shell eggs [43]. Domestic chickens were experi‑
mentally inoculated with various isolates of PPMV-1
viruses intramuscularly and gross and histologic lesions
were observed as well as morbidity [44]. Overt clinical
disease was rare and none of the infected chickens suc‑
cumbed to disease during the follow-up period (14 days
post-infection). Immunohistochemistry determined that
the heart and brain were the primarily affected tissues.
Sampling in 2013 detected seropositivity in 11.7% of
Columbiformes evaluated which included Eurasian col‑
lared doves (Streptopelia decaocto), rock doves (Columba
livia), and zebra doves (Geopelia striata) [46]. All of the
viruses isolated from this study were found in rock doves
and found to be virulent strains furthering the assertion
that rock doves are associated with PPMV-1 virus main‑
tenance in the United States. They are found uniformly
throughout the U.S. [47].

3 Domestic poultry
3.1 Geographical distribution

The United States poultry industry generates $48 billion
in revenue and is comprised primarily of broiler chickens
(8.5 billion birds), layer hens (299 million birds), and tur‑
keys (238 million birds) [48]. Iowa, Indiana, Ohio, Penn‑
sylvania, and Texas are the top five layer producing states
and are responsible for 52% of all the eggs produced
within the United States [49]; whereas top broiler pro‑
ducing states include Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, North
Carolina, and Mississippi [50]. Figure 1 depicts poultry
inventory across the entire U.S., irrespective of bird or
farm type.
Domestic poultry production certainly overlaps with
the geographical distribution of the two primary wild
avian reservoir species. The last detectable outbreak of
virulent NDV in domestic poultry in the U.S. occurred
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Figure 1 Distribution of poultry production within the United States, 2012. Figure from the United States Department of Agriculture,
National Agricultural Statistics Service (2015), used with permission—[51].

in 2002–2003, starting in illegally imported game fowl
[52]. This outbreak initiated in southern California before
moving into Nevada, Arizona, and ultimately, Texas; with
infections being confined to backyard flocks in all states
but California where the virus did spillover into com‑
mercial operations [53]. Phylogenetic analysis of the virus
showed that the strains were very similar to those circu‑
lating in Mexico and Honduras and that the California,
Nevada, and Arizona viruses were a result of a single
point introduction of the virus.

3.2 Commercial domestic poultry management

Exact information and specific details related to poultry
production in the United States is particularly difficult to
acquire and much of it is kept as proprietary data. A huge
majority (likely > 98%) of domestic poultry are intensively
managed with nearly 100% of breeding stock and 100%
of large, commercial poultry operations existing in this
type of system. In recent years, there have been changes
in labeling (ex: cage free, free range) and subsequently,
management practices have been modified to reflect
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these production systems. However, these “specialty”
production systems compose a tiny fraction of the overall
production of meat and eggs in the U.S.
The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) is a
collaborative program between industry and state and
federal governments that was originally established to
abolish pullorum disease and today serves to enhance
international trade and prevent the introduction of pests
and diseases that would be costly to the poultry industry
and agricultural resources. This program includes com‑
mercial poultry, turkeys, waterfowl, exhibition poultry,
backyard poultry, and game birds. Fourteen biosecurity
principles were drafted and presented at the Biennial
Conference for NPIP, which occurred August 30th to Sep‑
tember 1st, 2016 at which time they were amended and
ultimately, voted on. All of the proposed principles were
passed in either their exact drafted form or a slightly
amended version. Commercial poultry operations in all
participating states (which includes all U.S. states, except
Hawaii) that desire to transport birds across state lines or
engage in international export are then responsible for
implementing the principles on their premise. Principle
#14 describes the auditing process, but briefly, auditing is
performed by the Official State Agency to ensure compli‑
ance at least once every 2 years.
Information regarding the majority of domestic poul‑
try operations and the likely impending biosecurity
regulations from the NPIP have been described to pro‑
vide information on the management of commercial
poultry and insight relevant to biosecurity concerns and
practices. This intensive management and attention to
high risk routes of contamination offers a vantage point
related to preventing Newcastle disease virus or detect‑
ing and confining an outbreak very quickly, should a velo‑
genic strain be introduced. Biosecurity must be enacted
along with vaccination protocols to enhance the efficacy
of the control program.
3.3 Common vaccination protocols in the United States
for commercial poultry operations

The domestic poultry industry is not mandated to pro‑
vide vaccinations against specific pathogens by any gov‑
erning body; thus, each producer can determine what
vaccines they would like to administer. This is typically
based on geographical location, life span, perceived risks,
and other components; however, industry experts believe
the prevalence of NDV vaccination to be close to 100%
for intensively managed domestic poultry in the United
States. Long-lived birds, specifically broiler breeders and
layers, are usually vaccinated multiple times for NDV
whereas shorter lived birds typically receive one vaccine,
either in ovo or at 1 day of age in the hatchery (Personal
communication, U.S. Poultry and Egg Association, 2016).
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The in ovo vaccine is a recombinant herpesvirus of tur‑
keys/Newcastle disease virus vaccine, whereas the vac‑
cine administered to day-old birds is typically a live NDV
vaccine. Broiler breeders often receive multiple rounds
of vaccinations for NDV of both live and inactivated vac‑
cines in order to provide the hatchling with sufficient lev‑
els of maternal antibodies. Layers tend to be vaccinated
less intensively and typically receive a live vaccine as it
is simpler to administer (often as a spray or in drinking
water). The NDV vaccines are primarily designed to pre‑
vent endemic low virulence strains that cause mild res‑
piratory signs from infecting domestic poultry which, if
unresolved at the time of slaughter, often result in carcass
condemnation which causes losses for producers. Indus‑
try insiders believe the U.S. domestic poultry population
is still, despite high levels of vaccination, highly suscep‑
tible to velogenic strains of NDV in the event of viral
introduction.
3.4 Domestic backyard poultry management

The level of management provided to backyard poultry
flocks is extremely variable, although it is very common
that these flocks are more extensively managed as com‑
pared to commercial poultry and likely < 10% of backyard
poultry are vaccinated in any capacity (Personal commu‑
nication, Merial, 2016). While backyard poultry flocks
are a small fraction of U.S. poultry production, they are
of greater concern to be exposed to virulent avian avula‑
virus because of the lack of vaccination and biosecurity.
They may serve as amplification hosts which increases
the probability that virulent NDV could spill over into
commercial poultry flocks due to large amounts of circu‑
lating virus. As an example, Europe is considered free of
virulent NDV in commercial poultry; however, outbreaks
in backyard birds occurs periodically [54, 55]. Given the
breadth of exposure of backyard poultry to wild birds
and environmental factors, surveillance efforts in these
domestic birds may be useful to gather data on circulat‑
ing viruses and their pathogenicity.

4 Zoonotic potential
Avian avulaviruses are capable of infecting humans
and infection typically results in conjunctivitis and/or
influenza-like symptoms, including fever, headache, and
malaise [4]. Exposure to a large amount of virus is nec‑
essary, thus human infections are most common in indi‑
viduals working on poultry farms or in slaughterhouses.
There has been one documented instance in which a
42-year old man with a history of non-Hodgkin’s lym‑
phoma developed a lethal pneumonia following a periph‑
eral blood stem cell transplant [56]. Genomic sequencing
demonstrated that the NDV strain found in the deceased
patient was likely an isolate of urban-dwelling doves and
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pigeons. The patient was not known to have any contact
with avian species and the authors hypothesize that he
was exposed in his urban neighborhood either through
direct contact or aerosolized bird feces containing infec‑
tious virus.
Despite the ability for avian avulaviruses to infect
humans this pathogen should be considered a low prior‑
ity for public health agencies because of the high infec‑
tious dose and the mild clinical symptoms observed in
immune-competent individuals. Fomite transmission
of NDV is a documented route of spread due to robust
viral stability; thus, special precautions should be taken
for individuals that work closely with domestic poul‑
try and are immune-compromised or for workers that
co-habitate with an individual that is immune-compro‑
mised [3].

5 Vaccines
Multiple vaccination regimens are used throughout the
world for domestic poultry and are fairly efficacious in
preventing clinical disease, although there is no steriliz‑
ing immunity and vaccinated birds may be infected and
shed virulent NDV without becoming ill [57, 58]. All
NDV strains are of the same serotype, thus nearly any
strain can be used in a vaccine because of similar anti‑
genic properties resulting in a fairly uniform immune
response irrespective of the vaccine strain [59]. However,
further work has demonstrated that vaccine strains that
are homologous with the challenge virus or field strains
expected to infect the birds in a given region, are able to
substantially reduce oral shedding as compared to heter‑
ologous vaccines; furthermore, the evolution of virulent
strains of NDV may be facilitated by the interaction of
vaccine strains and endemically circulating viruses that
have large phylogenetic or antigenic variation in compar‑
ison to the vaccine strain [6, 60].
Two vaccination methods are predominant: inactivated
and live vaccines [61]. Inactivated vaccinations are con‑
siderably more expensive as compared to live vaccines
due to the need to handle individual birds and provide an
injection, either intramuscularly or subcutaneously [62].
Live vaccines are often provided in mass either via a spray
or drinking water. Both live and inactivated vaccines are
produced in specific-pathogen-free (SPF) embryonated
eggs [61].
A wide variety of vaccines and vaccination proto‑
cols are utilized across the globe depending on endemic
strains, domestic poultry production practices, access to
a cold chain, and many other factors. The B1 and LaSota
strains are lentogenic viruses that are commonly used in
vaccination schemes, often serially [59, 63]. B1 is a very
mild strain and is often administered initially, followed by
a booster with a slightly more pathogenic vaccine strain,
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such as LaSota. Initial vaccination typically occurs either
at 2–4 weeks of age (after maternal antibody has waned)
or at 1 day of age which results in an active infection that
will persist until maternal antibody has waned [62]. These
birds are then re-vaccinated at 2–4 weeks of age.
The mass inoculation strategy of live (sometimes atten‑
uated) vaccines has resulted in concern about the poten‑
tial for reversion to virulence of attenuated strains or the
leaching of these strains into the environment [6, 62]. In
fact, Miller et al. articulate three factors that contribute to
the risk of an outbreak: (1) only a few nucleotide changes
are needed on the fusion gene to convert a low virulence
virus to a strain of high virulence, (2) the low virulence
viruses are endemic nearly universally and large, highly
mobile reservoirs are capable of moving these viruses
around the globe, (3) billions of (mostly live) vaccines are
administered annually, often in a spray or drinking water,
which likely leads to environmental contamination.
Importantly, vaccinated poultry have been implicated as
the reservoir for virulent strains of NDV as a result of the
ability to become infected with virulent strains follow‑
ing vaccination and shed infectious virus in the absence
of clinical disease [6]. This topic is still widely discussed
as some believe shedding of infectious virus is result‑
ant from incomplete or non-uniform mass vaccination
methods; however, some evidence does exist to suggest
that vaccinated birds may serve as reservoirs for viru‑
lent NDV [64]. Furthermore, vaccination may be provid‑
ing selective pressure that favors the evolution of variant
forms of NDV, especially driven by the genetic homoge‑
neity of hosts, production practices (high density), and
intensive and imprecise vaccination protocols.
Additionally, a recent review of NDV vaccines by Dim‑
itrov et al. asserts that new vaccine concepts are needed
as current vaccination protocols are insufficient to quell
disease under various environmental conditions. Chal‑
lenges identified are specifically related to uneven vac‑
cine application under mass vaccine administration
techniques, difficulty vaccinating free-roaming birds,
especially those of varying ages, obstacles maintaining
the cold chain, and pre-existing antibodies which can
neutralize the vaccine and reduce efficacy [65].

6 Diagnostics
A wide variety of diagnostic tools have been developed
to determine pathogen identity. These methods are often
used serially. Samples collected from sick and dying birds
can be inoculated into embryonated eggs and further dif‑
ferentiation can be undertaken. Mean death time (MDT)
is a frequently used diagnostic which involves inoculat‑
ing samples into embryonated eggs and determining
the time in hours required to kill the chicken embryo
[3]. The intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) and
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the intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) involve the
weighted scoring of clinical signs following an intracer‑
ebral or intravenous injection, respectively, in day old
chicks. ICPI is the test of choice for NDV whereas IVPI
is used only occasionally and never for official purposes.
The gold standard for NDV diagnostics is virus isola‑
tion followed by hemagglutination and hemagglutina‑
tion inhibition. Table 1 depicts the MDT, ICPI, and IVPI
associated with lentogenic, mesogenic, and velogenic
viruses. These values are derived from Alexander 1998
but it should be noted that exceptions exist [66]. Further
pathotyping often occurs when live virus is isolated in
order to determine strain virulence via the evaluation of
the amino acid residues at the fusion site.
The costs and challenges associated with obtaining
SPF eggs and day-old chicks make real-time RT-PCR
methods an attractive alternative [67]. From a serologi‑
cal perspective, a hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) assay or
an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) can be
used to evaluate the presence of NDV-specific antibodies
in the host [6]. Both the HI and ELISA diagnostics can
be used to detect antigen or antibody. Serological diag‑
nostics do not allow for the differentiation of antibodies
resultant from exposure to a vaccine strain as compared
to a virulent NDV isolate; therefore, they are not tre‑
mendously efficacious for the determination of NDV as
the cause of a specific outbreak because of rampant vac‑
cination. Many commercial operations closely moni‑
tor the serology of a flock at the time of slaughter, often
using an ELISA (Personal communication, Merial, 2016).
Based on years of data, a normal range is determined for
the antibody titer for NDV and anything that exceeds
that value is subject to further testing and more intensive
evaluation. This monitoring helps identify an abnormal‑
ity very quickly and mobilize a response in the event of
an introduction.

7 Emergency preparedness for the United States
A viral incursion of NDV into the U.S. could likely cause
severe morbidity and mortality in the domestic poultry
industry in addition to enormous economic losses pri‑
marily associated with trade restrictions. The Newcastle
Table 1 Summary of diagnostic parameters associated
with avian avulavirus
Diagnostic tool

Velogenic
strains

Mesogenic
strains

Lentogenic
strains

Mean death time

< 60 h

60–90 h

> 90 h

Intracerebral pathogenicity
index

1.5–2

1–1.5

0.0–0.5

Intravenous pathogenicity
index

2.0–3.0

0–0.5

0.0

Disease Response Plan, The Red Book was created in
2014 by USDA APHIS Veterinary Services and provides
strategic guidance for government officials and first
responders in the event of a NDV outbreak. The manual
also provides current policy information and a strategic
framework for the control and eradication of NDV in the
event of a viral incursion. Furthermore, the FAD Prep
Document provides information about the Newcastle
disease virus such that responders and stakeholders can
have a common understanding of the pathogen etiology.

8 Risk analysis
Globalization, international trade, and migratory wild
avian species of questionable NDV infection status
increase the likelihood of virulent avian avulavirus intro‑
duction. A number of routes are of concern, including
a point introduction via transportation of live birds or
poultry products, viral persistence on fomites, or con‑
taminated poultry food, water, or supplies. Because of
the prevalence of wild avian species that are known to
carry virulent strains of NDV it is also possible that an
outbreak is initiated by a spillover event in which a viru‑
lent strain of NDV from double-crested cormorants, rock
doves, or alternative wild bird types are transmitted to
domestic poultry. Additionally, backyard domestic poul‑
try pose a risk of viral transmission and amplification due
to their exposure to wild birds and other environmental
factors. Finally, because of the high rate of mutation of
RNA viruses during replication, a virulent strain may be
introduced to domestic poultry as a result of imprecise
replication following the introduction of a lowly virulent
wild bird strain.
8.1 Risk of introduction to the United States

Potential routes of introduction include live bird trans‑
portation [24, 25], fomites [25], poultry product trans‑
portation [68], contaminated food and water [69],
airborne transmission [70], contaminated vaccines [71,
72], and non-avian carriers [74]. This sub-section focuses
specifically on potential routes of introduction into the
United States based on import regulations, the presence
of wild avian species that have demonstrated a capacity
to harbor virulent strains of the pathogen, and the wide‑
spread use of live vaccines in conjunction with the inex‑
act replication process of a RNA virus.
8.1.1 Legal movement of live birds

Birds are imported into the United States through one
of three import centers found in Los Angeles, California;
Miami, Florida; and New York, New York. All imported
poultry are subject to a 30 day quarantine irrespective
of the NDV-status in the country of origin. Imported
hatching eggs are differentiated into those derived from
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NDV-endemic and NDV-free countries and they require
a 30 day quarantine or are immediately released following
veterinary inspection at the port of entry, respectively.
Import procedures for non-domestic avian species are
characterized for: (1) commercial birds—imported for
resale, breeding, public display, or any other purpose,
excluding pet birds, zoo birds, research birds, or per‑
forming, theatrical birds; (2) zoo birds—imported to a
zoo facility for breeding, public display, recreational or
educational purposes; (3) pet birds (which are further
classified as U.S. origin and non-U.S. origin)—imported
for personal pleasure of their individual owners and are
not intended for resale (paraphrased from the United
States Department of Agriculture regulatory guide‑
lines). Regulations for commercial and pet birds (both
U.S. origin and non-U.S. origin) are very similar and in
both instances an import permit is required along with
a health certificate completed by a certified veterinarian
in the export country within 30 days of departure. The
health certificate must indicate that the bird has not been
vaccinated for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI),
including H5 and H7 subtypes, may not transit through
regions considered to be high risk for HPAI by the Ani‑
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), must
have been vaccinated for NDV more than 21 days prior
to export with a lentogenic strain or not be vaccinated
(either scenario must be clearly indicated on the health
certificate), and must be free of any evidence of com‑
municable diseases. Furthermore, imported commercial
and pet birds are subject to a 30-day quarantine at one
of the three import centers; pet birds of U.S. origin can,
however, complete the quarantine period in the home.
Zoo bird importation similarly mandates an import per‑
mit and a health certificate stating all of the same infor‑
mation, less one important difference: these birds may
be vaccinated for HPAI, including subtypes H5 and H7,
but the health certificate must clearly indicate whether
or not the bird has been vaccinated. Zoo birds must also
undergo a 30-day quarantine period; however, this can
occur at either a USDA facility or at an APHIS approved
zoo.
Each of the three legal avian import centers in the
United States kindly provided data regarding com‑
mercial and pet bird importation, specifically informa‑
tion relevant to species imported and country of origin.
The Los Angeles import center received 29 164 psittac‑
ines between August 2013 and August 2016, the Miami
import center received 34 psittacines for commercial
or pet use during the 2015 federal fiscal year (Octo‑
ber 2014 through September 2015), and the New York
import center received 28 psittacines during the 2015
calendar year. Table 2 depicts the types of psittacines that
were imported into the U.S. via the three animal import
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Table 2 Types of psittacines imported into the U.S.
through the three animal import centers—Los Angeles, CA
(between August 2013 and August 2016), Miami, FL (during the 2015 federal fiscal year), and New York, NY (during
the 2015 calendar year) (n = 29 266)
Bird type

Number imported

Unspecified psittacines

25 865

Parrots

1509

Parakeets

1741

Macaws

8

Budgerigars

86

Cockatiels

14

Cockatoos
Total

3
29 226

centers. Unspecified psittacines made up a huge major‑
ity of the imports (approximately 89%), with parrots and
parakeets each accounting for about 5% of imports, and
budgerigars, macaws, cockatiels, and cockatoos each rep‑
resenting a tiny proportion of psittacine imports.
The continent of origin for the vast majority of psitta‑
cines that were imported into the U.S. during the afor‑
mentioned time period was Africa, accounting for about
85% of all imports (Table 3). Approximately 11% of psit‑
tacine imports were from Australia and 2% of imports
were from each Asia and Europe, with few psittacines
imported from either North or South America. It is
important to note that the country of origin reported is
where the birds come from prior to entry in the United
States and is not necessarily representative of their true
origin.
8.1.2 Legal movement of animal products, byproducts,
and animal feed

All avian products and byproducts derived from an NDVendemic region must be mitigated prior to importation
Table 3 Continent of origin for psittacines imported
into the U.S. through the three animal import centers—
Los Angeles, CA (between August 2013 and August 2016),
Miami, FL (during the 2015 federal fiscal year), and New
York, NY (during the 2015 calendar year) (n = 29 266)
Continent of origin

Number imported

Africa

24 787

Australia

3276

Asia

654

Europe

471

North America
South America
Total

25
13
29 226
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using an APHIS approved method that has been shown
to inactivate NDV. Products and byproducts derived
from NDV-free regions are allowed to be imported in a
raw form. Animal feed containing avian products must
be cooked to an internal temperature of 74 °C prior to
importation from NDV-endemic regions; however, NDVfree regions may import raw animal feed products.
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A

CONTINENT OF ORIGIN FOR AVIAN AND POULTRY
PRODUCTS CONFISCATED BY U.S. CBP BETWEEN 2012-2016
South America
Unknown
North America
Europe
Australia

Africa

8.1.3 Illegal movement of live birds and their products

The illegal transport of live animals and their products is
of concern for disease transmission because of the lack
of governmental oversight, the types of products being
moved, and their country of origin and final destination.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) is primarily responsible
for the confiscation of illegally imported products and
specimens from domestic poultry species. Data provided
by CBP depicts products and specimens from domes‑
tic poultry and birds that were confiscated in the cargo
or express courier environment or via international mail
facilities. Between calendar years 2012 and 2016, nearly
75 000 products and specimens derived from domestic
poultry and other birds were confiscated by CBP. The
continent of origin for the majority of products and spec‑
imens (~88%) confiscated by CBP is Asia, which is enzo‑
otic for virulent NDV. Europe and North America, both
of which are free from virulent strains of NDV in domes‑
tic poultry, comprise 7 and 3% of the poultry and avian
confiscations, respectively. Products and specimens from
Africa, Australia, South America, and unknown conti‑
nent of origin each comprise less than 1% of all confisca‑
tions. This data is summarized in Figure 2A.
A large number of samples from NDV susceptible spe‑
cies were confiscated and in many circumstances were
derived from continents with regions that are enzootic
for NDV. The exact number of products and specimens
that are smuggled across the U.S. border is difficult to
ascertain and it can be assumed that the products and/or
specimens discovered represent a small subsection of the
types of goods that are illegally imported into the United
States. Because of the types of products confiscated and
the regions of the world from which they originate, the
illegal importation of domestic poultry and other avian
products and specimens pose a risk for virulent NDV
introduction.
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service data show
that nearly 400 000 wild avian specimens were illegally
imported or improperly documented and were sub‑
sequently confiscated by the Fish and Wildlife Service
between 2007 and 2016 in the United States. Our focus
is on psittacines as they have demonstrated their capac‑
ity to shed infectious NDV for up to 1 year following

Asia

B

DESCRIPTION OF PSITTACINE SPECIMENS CONFISCATED BY
U.S. FWS (2007-2016)
Carcasses Trophy
Skin piece Unspecified
Trim
Speciman
Jewelry

Live birds

Feathers

Figure 2 Country of origin and types of psittacine specimens confiscated by CBP and FWS, respectively. A A pie chart
depicting the continent of origin for the products and specimens
confiscated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection between 2012
and 2016 (n = 74 837). B A pie chart depicting the type of psittacine
specimens confiscated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services between
2007 and 2016 (n = 4046).

infection. Psittacine specimen confiscations accounted
for 1% of all the avian contraband confiscated and 75% of
those confiscations were feathers, followed by 22% which
was jewelry, and live birds, trim, skin pieces, carcasses,
unspecified, trophy, and specimens each accounted for
less than 1% (Figure 2B). These illegal seizure numbers
are concerning as NDV can persist outside of the host,
but overall, the risk they pose is likely lower than the risk
associated with live birds.
Illegally imported psittacine specimens were con‑
fiscated at 20 different ports around the country (Fig‑
ure 3). It is important to note that the graphed data are
based on the total number of specimens confiscated,
not the number of individual events in which specimens
were confiscated. For example, in New York, NY there
were three times in which psittacine specimens were
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Number of specimens seized

2200

Page 11 of 15
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2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

Confiscaon locaon
Figure 3 Psittacine specimens confiscated. Number of psittacine specimens confiscated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service between 2007 and
2016 at various ports in the United States (n = 4046).

confiscated between 2007 and 2016, but one of the inci‑
dences involved the confiscation of over 2000 feathers
(n = 2004).
Estimating the percentage of illegally imported animals
that are detected and confiscated in the United States is
difficult; however, it is interesting to note the number
of avian species, both those that are live birds, as well
as feathers and other body parts, which are confiscated.
These data suggest that illegal bird and bird product
importation could result in an introduction of virulent
NDV because of the types of birds being imported, the
lack of veterinary oversight and quarantine procedures,
and the country of origin (many of which are endemic for
virulent strains of NDV).
8.1.4 Spillover event from wild avian species

Double-crested cormorants and Columbiform birds,
specifically pigeons and doves, have been implicated as
amplification or reservoir hosts that appear to be fre‑
quently infected with, or carriers of, virulent strains of
avian avulavirus [31, 37–41, 43–46]. Spillover events
from these wild avian species into domestic poultry
operations could have deleterious effects, both in terms
of virus-induced morbidity and mortality as well as eco‑
nomic impacts resulting from trade restrictions and the
cost of controlling and eradicating the disease [5]. Addi‑
tionally, substantial economic losses are also associated
with less virulent strains as a result of impaired growth,

altered feed utilization, and reduced egg production in
affected birds [73]. Due to the acute stability of NDV and
the apparent overlap between double-crested cormorant
breeding and wintering grounds, rock dove habitat, and
the majority of clustering relative to domestic poultry
operations (Figure 1), a virulent strain harbored by wild
avian species could spill over into domestic poultry. The
most likely routes of virus introduction would either be
a result of fomite transmission (vehicles, equipment, or
personnel that become contaminated) or because of
direct contamination of domestic poultry or their food or
water sources by infected wild species. The latter is a risk
primarily associated with pigeons because of their peridomestic nature and this route of transmission has his‑
torically been reported for infection of domestic poultry
by infected feces of wild pigeons [25]. The best method to
prevent this type of transmission is to have vehicles and
equipment that are site-specific or that are thoroughly
disinfected between operations, procedures with detailed
information on biosecurity procedures following expo‑
sure to outside birds, and poultry housing facilities as
well as food and water sources that are maintained in a
setting that is inaccessible to nuisance creatures.
8.1.5 Spontaneous mutation

Avirulent and virulent viruses have varying amino acid
sequences at the fusion site which allows for differen‑
tial cleavage in the host leading to either a localized or
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systemic infection, respectively. The homology between
virulent and avirulent viruses combined with the high
mutation rate in RNA viruses make it possible for an
avirulent strain to spontaneously mutate into a virulent
strain. Only three amino acid substitutions are necessary
for this transformation [75].
Between 2007 and 2009, multiple isolates of avian avu‑
lavirus were submitted to the National Veterinary Ser‑
vices Laboratory from turkey flocks in the United States
and were found to have a fusion cleavage site of 113-K-QG-R-F-117 [76]. This sequence contains two of the three
necessary amino acids between 113 and 116, to be con‑
sidered a virulent strain, and a phenylalanine at site 117.
Furthermore, these isolates were collected from flocks
where the turkeys had signs of mild respiratory disease.
Interestingly, pathogenicity tests in embryonated chicken
eggs and day old chicks found these viruses to be low vir‑
ulence in chickens and are likely host-adapted to turkeys.
This finding however, is of concern as repeated viral pas‑
sages through infected birds elevates the probability of a
spontaneous mutation into a virulent strain.

9 Conclusions
Virulent Newcastle disease virus, represented by vari‑
ous strains of avian avulavirus, is a highly transmissible
virus that results in near-uniform mortality in domestic
poultry species. Furthermore, detection of virulent NDV
is a mandatory reportable disease to OIE and results in
severe, and often long-lasting, restrictions in interna‑
tional trade. Economic losses associated with the disease
extend well beyond trade embargos, including eradica‑
tion programs aimed at culling birds from infected farms
and preventing further transmission between flocks.
Double-crested cormorants and rock doves have been
implicated as a potential reservoir species in the United
States, in addition to vaccinated domestic poultry spe‑
cies. Newcastle disease is a zoonotic disease; however,
a huge majority of individuals who become infected are
asymptomatic or develop a mild, self-limiting disease. A
plethora of diagnostic tools exist, ranging from virus iso‑
lation followed by pathotyping, to RNA detection, and
serological methods. Continuing to closely monitor both
domestic poultry as well as wild avian species is crucial
in order to detect an outbreak quickly and eradicate an
exotic introduction swiftly. This surveillance necessitates
reliable diagnostic methodologies and preferably tools
that can detect multiple pathogens simultaneously using
metagenomics capabilities. Dimitrov et al. describe a
next-generation sequencing approach for the characteri‑
zation of RNA virus genomes which allows for efficient,
cost-effective diagnostics [77]. Practicing robust bios‑
ecurity measures, especially those related to preventing
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pigeons from accessing food and water sources of
domestic poultry, are essential for avoiding a disease
outbreak.
Psittacines are often considered to be higher risk spe‑
cies as they can shed NDV for up to a year; however, the
legal route of importation of these birds, and all others,
into the United States is quite comprehensive. All legally
imported birds are quarantined for 30 days during which
time they are tested for NDV using the virus isolation
assay and upon completion of the quarantine period and
a negative NDV test, are released. Illegally imported birds
that are confiscated are either euthanized or quarantined
and tested prior to release, depending on oversight from
both USDA Veterinary Services and U.S. Fish and Wild‑
life Service. The strict import regulations for live birds
and their products, as well as stringent guidelines related
to NDV as a Tier 1 Select Agent, are of high importance
as human activities have been shown to result in spillo‑
ver events [78]. The illegal importation of birds and their
products is difficult to control, manage, or regulate. This
route certainly serves as a risk for NDV importation and
subsequently, introduction.
The wild bird reservoirs of NDV found in the U.S.
complicate the potential for viral incursion in domes‑
tic poultry. Understanding how these moderately and
highly virulent viruses are maintained in pigeons and
cormorants is fundamental to our comprehension of
the landscape and other risk factors that substantially
contribute to a viral incursion in domestic poultry. A
surveillance program designed to sample birds of the
Columbidae family could identify avian avulavirus
strains circulating in wild birds and could also be used
to assess the spillover of vaccines used in domestic
poultry into wild bird populations. Additionally, sam‑
pling confiscated psittacine specimens that were ille‑
gally imported could provide increased understanding
of the types of viruses that are entering the U.S. and
may lead to prophylactic measures to protect poultry
in the U.S. Backyard poultry flocks are believed to pre‑
sent a risk of viral amplification in the event of an NDV
introduction as they are typically unvaccinated and
extensively reared. NDV in backyard flocks that spilled
over to commercial poultry operations was linked to the
most recent outbreak in the United States and yields an
ever-present challenge. The discovery of virulent strains
of NDV circulating in backyard chickens in Bulgaria
and Ukraine between 2002 and 2013 suggests a domes‑
tic or urban cycle of viral maintenance [69]. Maintain‑
ing robust surveillance and reporting systems is crucial
in order to detect and control a foreign animal disease
outbreak, especially in an at-risk population, such as
backyard poultry.
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Additional file
Additional file 1. Summary of temporal and geographical distribution of NDV strains. Data regarding class and genotype, strain virulence,
and global distribution are based on Dimitrov et al. [27], with additional
information from other manuscripts (cited in table).
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